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SMOKING OUT BIG TOBACCO: CAN THE FAMILY 
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 
EQUIP THE FDA TO REGULATE TOBACCO WITHOUT 
INFRINGING ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
ABSTRACT 
Tobacco use is one of the most catastrophic public health issues facing the 
world today.  The recently passed Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act (FSPTCA) gives the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) unprecedented power to regulate tobacco products.  While Congress 
has explicitly maintained the legality of tobacco distribution in the United 
States, the FDA’s newfound regulatory authority under the FSPTCA is a 
necessary step to continue the fight against tobacco use.  Among the most 
significant provisions of the FSPTCA are restrictions aimed at tobacco 
advertising and promotions.  These provisions, however, may 
unconstitutionally infringe on First Amendment commercial speech under the 
judicially crafted commercial speech doctrine governed by Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.  Indeed, after the 
FSPTCA’s passage, several tobacco companies filed suit, arguing that these 
advertising restrictions violate the First Amendment. 
This Comment examines the constitutionality of the FSPTCA by first 
explaining the development of the commercial speech doctrine from Central 
Hudson to Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
application of the commercial speech doctrine.  This Comment further explains 
the wavering deference afforded the legislature under this doctrine, making 
Central Hudson’s modern application uncertain.  It then follows with an 
analysis of the relevant FSPTCA provisions at issue, examines proposed 
amendments to make the FSPTCA constitutional, and discusses implications 
for the FDA’s jurisdiction over tobacco. 
Ultimately, in light of the probable unconstitutionality of a portion of the 
FSPTCA, this Comment argues that Congress must amend the provisions by 
narrowly tailoring them to meet the government’s substantial interest in 
preventing underage tobacco consumption.  If these provisions are not 
modified to fall within the constitutional confines of Central Hudson, the 
FSPTCA will be nothing more than an impotent piece of legislation, leaving an 
overworked FDA to pick up the pieces. 
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INTRODUCTION: FIGHTING THE WAR AGAINST TEEN SMOKING 
[T]he marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic 
industries of the United States with ramifying activities which directly 
affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable 
conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare.1 
After nearly fifty years of falling smoking rates, tobacco consumption in 
the United States is increasing.2  Today, roughly 20% of adults in the United 
States are smokers.3  Smoking kills more than 400,000 Americans a year4 and 
more than five million people worldwide.5  Death is not the only social ill 
caused by tobacco products; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
estimates that tobacco-related illness in the United States costs upward of $193 
billion each year in health care expenditures and lost productivity.6  Equally 
troublesome is the number of young people using tobacco products in the 
United States.  According to the Surgeon General, more than three million 
American adolescents use smoking products, one million adolescent males use 
smokeless tobacco products, and 82% of adults who have tried smoking first 
smoked when they were under the age of eighteen.7  In contrast to the striking 
toll on productivity and millions of deaths around the globe is the enormous 
profit for the corporations that control the tobacco market.8  To protect this 
 
 1 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137 (2000) (quoting Agriculture 
Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-357, § 611(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1522) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 Betsy McKay, Downward Trend in Smoking Rate Stalls, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at A3 
(discussing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2008 national survey and reporting that 
states who have used more aggressive regulatory schemes to curtail smoking have lower smoking rates and 
that the CDC is hopeful that the FDA’s newly implemented regulatory scheme will have a more beneficial 
impact on the continuing decline in smoking rates). 
 3 Id. (increasing from 19.8% in 2007 to 20.6% in 2008). 
 4 It has been well publicized that smoking has killed more than 400,000 people a year in the United 
States since the late 1980s.  See, e.g., Cigarette Smoking: Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life 
Lost—United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 645, 645 (1993) (434,000 deaths 
attributable to tobacco use in 1988); Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts (last updated Sept. 15, 2010) 
(443,000 Americans die of tobacco-related causes each year). 
 5 See Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, supra note 4. 
 6 See id. ($97 billion in lost productivity and $96 billion in health care expenditures). 
 7 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
897, 1140) [hereinafter 1996 Final Rule] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING 
TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5, 65 (1994)). 
 8 Compare Duff Wilson, Philip Morris Meeting Mixes Tobacco Profit and Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2009, at B5 (reporting profits of $16.3 billion on cigarettes sold outside the United States), with British Am. 
Tobacco, Big Four Tobacco Profits Summary (Jan. 1, 1992), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ 
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market share and profitability, tobacco companies spend more than $6.1 billion 
a year on advertising.9 
While headlines in recent decades have publicized strong efforts by the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to curb tobacco use,10 the 
government has not always been so assertive in addressing the public health 
problems created by tobacco products. 
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).11  The FDCA defines the scope of FDA jurisdiction over drugs and 
medical devices12 and requires the FDA to ensure that all drugs and devices are 
safe and effective.13  Less than twenty years after the FDCA’s passage, the 
Surgeon General declared that smoking causes lung cancer and other 
diseases.14  In response, the House passed a bill amending the FDCA to include 
FDA oversight of tobacco,15 but the bill never made it through the Senate. 
Following that failure, Congress enacted numerous pieces of legislation 
designed to regulate the tobacco industry.  For instance, in 1965, Congress 
enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).16  Since 
the FCLAA’s inception, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has exercised 
regulatory authority over cigarette labels and imposed restrictions on claims, 
while enforcing mandatory Surgeon General’s warnings on packaging.17  In 
 
uai50a99/pdf (showing that the combined profits of the top four tobacco companies were over $16.8 billion in 
1992, and Phillip Morris’s profits were over $10.9 billion in that same year). 
 9 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,475 (discussing 1993 Federal Trade Commission figures). 
 10 See, e.g., Winford R. McGowan III, Comment, Is It Time to Give Congressional Delegation a New 
Filter?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 485, 497 (2002) (describing the media and social outcry against abusive tobacco 
company practices and the subsequent regulatory scheme imposed by the FDA); Barnaby J. Feder, Tobacco 
Curbs Face Legal Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1.8. 
 11 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)). 
 12 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h). 
 13 See id. §§ 355(d), 360d(a)(2). 
 14 PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
29 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/_/nnbbmq.pdf (finding smokers are 70% 
more likely to die of heart disease, 500% more likely to die from chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and 
1000% more likely to die of lung cancer). 
 15 H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965). 
 16 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006)). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).  There are four warnings required on cigarette packaging, to be implemented 
on a rotating basis: (1) “Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate 
Pregnancy”; (2) “Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”; (3) “Smoking By 
Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight”; and (4) “Cigarette 
Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.”  Id.  Similarly, there are three required warnings for smokeless tobacco 
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1967 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) entered the tobacco 
arena, promulgating regulations governing tobacco advertising on the radio 
and television.18  In addition to the FTC and FCC, government agencies like 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), have authority to 
regulate various aspects of the tobacco industry.19 
In 1996, the FDA unsuccessfully attempted to regulate tobacco products 
under the FDCA,20 which prohibits any misbranded food, drug, or device from 
“introduction into interstate commerce.”21  The FDCA denotes a product as 
misbranded “[i]f it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage or manner, 
or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in 
the labeling thereof.”22  However, to be regulated as a “drug,” the product must 
be “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease.”23  After extensively investigating tobacco companies’ practices, 
the FDA maintained that it had found the requisite intent needed to regulate 
tobacco products.24  Without imposing an outright ban, the FDA sought to 
 
packaging.  Id. § 4402(a)(1).  See generally Ronald M. Davis et al., The Rotation of Health Warnings in 
Cigarette Advertisements: Compliance with the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, 9 J. PUB. 
HEALTH POL’Y 403 (1988) (describing the increased efficacy of the mandated warning rotation system). 
 18 Jennifer Costello, Comment, The FDA’s Struggle to Regulate Tobacco, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 671, 677 & 
n.32 (1997) (describing the FCC’s initial regulatory role, which required smoking cessation advertising in 
conjunction with smoking advertising, and how successful lobbying by tobacco manufacturers led to a ban on 
tobacco radio and television advertising altogether).  Two years later Congress passed the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which banned tobacco advertising on the radio and television.  Pub. L. No. 91-
222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)). 
 19 See Costello, supra note 18, at 678 n.42 (explaining the IRS’s role in taxing tobacco sales, the 
Department of Agriculture’s regulation of tobacco farming, and the ATF’s job fighting illegal tobacco sales 
and distribution). 
 20 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,615–18.  These regulations are now the basis for certain 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA) provisions at issue.  FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387a–1(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009). 
 21 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006). 
 22 Id. § 352(j). 
 23 Id. § 321(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also id. § 321(h)(3) (“intent” requirement for medical devices 
that affect the structure or function of the body). 
 24 See id. § 321(h)(2)–(3) (defining a “device” as having an “intended” effect on the structure or function 
of the body or an “intended” use in the cure or prevention of disease).  This intent requirement has been a 
difficult hurdle for the FDA in the past.  See Costello, supra note 18, at 681–83 (discussing the FDA’s struggle 
to establish jurisdiction through indirect evidence of intent); see also United States v. 354 Bulk 
Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that cigarette labels 
showed the manufacturer’s intent to affect the structure or function of a user’s body). 
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classify cigarettes as restricted drug-delivery devices in an attempt to reduce 
the exposure and influence of tobacco on the nation’s adolescents.25 
Despite the FDA’s efforts, the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. held that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate 
the tobacco industry.26  The Court concluded that under the FDCA, tobacco 
would have to be banned altogether because it would be a “misbranded” 
product that could not be approved as safe and effective.27  But due to 
Congress’s repeated actions ensuring tobacco’s legality and prior FDA 
acquiescence over tobacco regulation, the FDA had no jurisdiction to regulate, 
or ban, tobacco products.28 
Responding to mounting public pressure following the Brown & 
Williamson decision, President Barack Obama signed the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA or Act) into law on June 22, 
2009.29  The FSPTCA adopts the ill-fated 1996 FDA regulations and gives the 
FDA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate tobacco,30 but specifically prohibits the 
FDA from banning tobacco sales or eliminating nicotine from cigarettes.31  
 
 25 See generally 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,398 (“[T]he agency has concluded that, while taking 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco off the market could prevent some people from becoming addicted and 
reduce death and disease for others, the record does not establish that such a ban is the appropriate public 
health response under the act.”). 
 26 529 U.S. 120, 132–33, 137 (2000) (applying the two-prong statutory interpretation test set out by the 
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also 
Costello, supra note 18, at 673–79 (describing Congress’s exclusion of the FDA in the development of tobacco 
regulation). 
 27 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 135–37 (relying on 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which prohibits introduction 
of misbranded goods into interstate commerce).  The Court found that if the FDA evaluated cigarettes as 
devices, it would have to regulate them as Class III devices subject to premarket approval, and as a result, 
tobacco products would not survive because of their danger.  Id. at 136. 
 28 Id. at 137–39 (“Congress has directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation 
on six occasions since 1965.”). 
 29 Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (amending FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)); see also 
Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, MSNBC.COM, June 22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
31481823 (“The decades-long effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of smoking has finally 
emerged victorious . . . .” (quoting President Barack Obama) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 30 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (Supp. III 2009); see also Regulating Tobacco: Q&A with Lawrence 
Deyton, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2 (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/UCM183967.pdf (discussing with the director at the Center for Tobacco Products the 
FDA’s plan to regulate tobacco products in a way that protects the vulnerable youth population from undue 
influence by tobacco advertising). 
 31 FSPTCA § 387g(d)(3) (noting the “importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a regulation” yet 
restricting the Secretary’s authority to reduce nicotine yields to zero or ban tobacco products).  The FDA aims 
to strike a balance between protecting the country’s youth from smoking and the rights of smokers to engage 
in legal consumption of cigarettes.  See Regulating Tobacco: Q&A with Lawrence Deyton, supra note 30, at 1; 
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The Act also includes advertising and promotional restrictions,32 and places an 
outright ban on the sale of flavored tobacco products.33 
In light of the First Amendment attack on the advertising provisions of the 
FSPTCA, Part I of this Comment analyzes the development of commercial 
speech jurisprudence stemming from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, which set the framework for the modern 
commercial speech doctrine.  Part II examines the constitutionality of select 
provisions of the Act and proposed amendments that may bring the FSPTCA’s 
advertising provisions within the province of the First Amendment.  This Part 
concludes by assessing the efficacy of the FSPTCA as it would stand without 
its advertising restrictions—arguably the FSPTCA’s most significant 
provisions.  It then argues for Congress to amend the Act to accommodate the 
First Amendment in order to give the FDA a fighting chance against the 
tobacco industry.  Part III reviews alternatives to the First Amendment position 
adopted here, while posing questions for future thought in the realm of public 
health regulation.  This Comment concludes by summarizing the 
constitutionality of the FSPTCA and the direction the FDA should take to most 
benefit public health and safety.  Overall, this Comment takes a skeptical look 
at the constitutionality of the FSPTCA in order to shed light on how this Act 
can remain viable to further the country’s best interests in the area of public 
health by successfully regulating tobacco products. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: BUILDING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
FRAMEWORK 
Among its provisions, the FSPTCA restricts tobacco advertising and 
product distribution, adopting the FDA’s 1996 regulations.34  Because the 
FSPTCA specifically gives the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, 
 
cf. James T. O’Reilly, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Blessing or Curse for FDA Professionals?, 64 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 459, 459–61 (2009) (arguing that despite the positive headlines about the FDA’s newfound 
regulation of tobacco, such regulation is really “the sticky remains of a messy bargain, negotiated in a 
distracted Congress by expensive lawyers with clients who were potent contributors to political action 
committees”). 
 32 For example, FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) significantly restricts free sample distribution.  See infra 
Part II.C.5. 
 33 FSPTCA § 387g(a)(1) (including flavors like cinnamon, chocolate, vanilla, and cherry, yet specifically 
excluding menthol from the ban). 
 34 Id. § 387a–1(a)(2). 
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the fight now centers on the First Amendment constitutionality of the proposed 
advertising and brand name distribution regulations.35 
On August 31, 2009, several major cigarette manufacturers filed suit 
against the United States and the FDA in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. 
United States, alleging that the advertising restrictions embodied in the 
FSPTCA unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment.36  These 
provisions include: restricting advertising to black-and-white text; restricting 
tobacco companies from advertising “light” cigarettes; prohibiting advertising 
within 1,000 feet of areas where children congregate; banning event 
sponsorship by tobacco companies; and prohibiting free sample distribution of 
cigarettes.37  On January 5, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky issued a summary judgment ruling, partly in favor of the 
tobacco companies and partly in favor of the government.38  Both sides plan to 
appeal the decision.39 
As a result of the pending appeal, an analysis of First Amendment 
commercial speech jurisprudence is necessary to give an informed perspective 
on the implications for the future of FDA tobacco regulation.  Thirty years ago, 
the Supreme Court set the standard for the regulation of commercial speech in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.40  
Section A analyzes this seminal case and sets the framework for subsequent 
commercial speech jurisprudence.  Section B discusses the emerging 
 
 35 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 34–42, Commonwealth Brands, 
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-117-M), 2009 WL 2842131 
[hereinafter Complaint]; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that 
the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products). 
 36 Complaint, supra note 35, at 34–42.  Interestingly, Altria Group, Inc. (owner of Philip Morris USA, 
Inc.) is the only major manufacturer openly supporting the Act.  See Letter from Michael E. Szymanczyk, 
Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Altria, to President Obama (June 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.ussmokeless.com/en/cms/Responsibility/Legislative_Issues/pdfs/MES_Letter_ 
061209.pdf.aspx (explaining that Altria supports curbing youth smoking through H.R. 1256 but questioning 
the First Amendment constitutionality of some of the Act’s provisions).  Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs filed 
suit in the Western District of Kentucky, an indisputably pro-tobacco state that relies on tobacco as its number 
one cash crop with an average of more than $800 million in revenue from 1990 to 1996.  WILL SNELL & 
STEPHAN GOETZ, UNIV. OF KY. COLL. OF AGRIC., OVERVIEW OF KENTUCKY’S TOBACCO ECONOMY 1 (1997), 
available at http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/pubs/aec/aec83/aec83.pdf. 
 37 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 34–42. 
 38 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 39 Duff Wilson, Judge Lifts Some Limits on Tobacco Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at B3.  The 
FDA filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2010.  See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND 
FDA STAFF 4 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM210766.pdf. 
 40 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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interpretation of Central Hudson and the varying standards of deference 
afforded the government since the test’s adoption. 
A. The Standard—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission 
After years of unclear commercial speech jurisprudence,41 the Supreme 
Court established a four-part test to govern the constitutionality of commercial 
speech regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission: 
For commercial speech to come within [First Amendment 
protection], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.42 
This test established a guiding standard of broad application in the wake of 
contrary precedent43 and unclear constitutional guidance with regard to 
government regulation of commercial speech.44 
In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated a New York regulation banning 
all promotional advertising by electric utility companies.45  The New York 
 
 41 Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment protects 
informational and political speech, not commercial advertising), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 
(1951) (finding a regulation prohibiting door-to-door solicitation constitutional despite the “fact that 
periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment”), abrogated by Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
825–26 (1975) (deeming Virginia’s statute prohibiting circulation of publications encouraging abortion to be 
an unconstitutional infringement of free speech even though the speech appeared in commercial form), and Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 (finding another Virginia statute unconstitutional where it restricted 
pharmacists’ advertisements of prescription drug prices because a state may not “completely suppress the 
dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s 
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients”). 
 42 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 43 Compare Breard, 341 U.S. at 642 (finding no First Amendment protection for door-to-door periodical 
sales), with Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26 (including legal pharmaceutical price advertising in First Amendment 
protection). 
 44 Compare Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (finding no constitutional protection for commercial speech), with 
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26 (providing First Amendment constitutional protection for commercial advertising 
of abortion). 
 45 447 U.S. at 557. 
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Public Service Commission first prohibited promotional advertising in the 
wake of a winter energy shortage.46  Three years later, however, the 
Commission continued to implement the restriction after the energy shortage 
had passed.47 
Applying these facts to its new test, the Court dispatched the first two 
prongs in short order: finding that the promotional advertising was lawful and 
nonmisleading48 and that regulations promoting energy conservation 
represented a substantial government interest in conserving energy and 
maintaining equitable rates.49 
Moving to the third prong, the Court accepted the government’s speculative 
argument that because promotional advertising directly increased demand, 
restricting such advertising would directly advance the government’s interest 
in energy conservation.50 
The Court asserted, however, that the Commission failed to establish the 
fourth prong—that the means used to further its substantial interest were not 
more extensive than necessary.51  Despite the government’s undoubtedly 
important interest in conserving energy and maintaining equitable rates, 
“suppressing information about electric devices or services” was unjustifiable 
because the regulation reached all promotional advertising regardless of its 
impact on energy use.52  Further, the Commission could not show that a more 
limited restriction would not serve the state’s interests in energy 
conservation.53 
 
 46 Id. at 558–59. 
 47 Id. at 559. 
 48 Id. at 566–68 (refuting the New York Court of Appeals’ argument that advertising by a monopoly can 
not improve decision making by consumers and thus is not worthy of First Amendment protection). 
 49 Id. at 568–69 (upholding a complex economic argument advanced by the Commission, which argued 
that promotional advertising would more likely lead to inequitable energy rates and distribution among 
consumers).  The Court utilizes a similar approach in most cases; the first two prongs are rarely at issue, while 
the Court spends most of its time on the latter two prongs.  See infra Part II. 
 50 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand 
for electricity.  Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would 
increase its sales.  Thus, we find a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Commission’s 
order.”). 
 51 Id. at 569–70. 
 52 Id. at 570. 
 53 Id. at 569–71 (considering that the Commission’s regulation also prevented Central Hudson from 
advertising energy conservation). 
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Central Hudson thereby established an intermediate scrutiny standard for 
the protection of nonmisleading commercial speech, placing the burden of 
proof on the government to substantiate its regulations on lawful commercial 
speech.54 
B. Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Following Central Hudson: Wavering 
Judicial Scrutiny of Government Regulation 
Despite the four clear prongs set forth in Central Hudson, the Supreme 
Court has inconsistently interpreted the standard, leaving lower courts with 
uncertainty and a flexible range of outcomes depending on the burden of proof 
and deference afforded the government.55  This section first highlights the 
wavering deference applied by the Court in the thirty years since the Central 
Hudson decision.  It then sets the stage for Part II by briefly explaining the 
background to the most recent Supreme Court commercial speech decision—
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.56 
Six years after Central Hudson, the Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico upheld a complete ban on casino 
advertising to Puerto Rico’s residents through the Games of Chance Act,57 
which sought to increase Puerto Rico’s tourism revenue, yet prohibited casinos 
from advertising “or otherwise offer[ing] their facilities to the public of Puerto 
 
 54 Id. at 566–71; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing his argument in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), that commercial 
speech should be given the same strict scrutiny protection given to noncommercial speech—similarly 
supported by Justice Scalia’s aversion to Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); Kerri L. Keller, Note, 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke by 
Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140–42, 
172–79 (2002) (arguing content-based speech should be given strict scrutiny protection even if it is 
“commercial” in nature). 
 55 Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 330–31 (1986) (declaring 
restrictions on the local advertising of gambling to be constitutional while giving deference to legislatures to 
establish regulations restricting speech), and United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) 
(upholding regulations restricting broadcasters from advertising lotteries while affording some deference to the 
legislature), with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993) (striking down a ban 
on commercial publications distributed through freestanding news racks on public property because the 
regulation barred an entire class of constitutionally protected speech), and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476, 488–91 (1995) (finding the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s prohibition against displaying 
alcohol-content percentages on alcohol-product labels failed both the third and fourth prongs of the Central 
Hudson test because the regulatory scheme was irrational and failed to use less intrusive alternatives). 
 56 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 57 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1972). 
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Rico.”58  For the first time, the Court deferred to the legislature, implementing 
a standard akin to rational basis scrutiny and departing from the intermediate 
scrutiny standard established in Central Hudson.59 
Applying the first Central Hudson prong, the Court plainly found gambling 
advertising lawful, giving it protection under the First Amendment.60  
Conversely, Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in regulating advertising for 
gambling—an activity that compromises “the health, safety and welfare of [its] 
citizens.”61  The Court made an about-face, however, in applying the third 
prong.  Deferring to the legislature’s findings, the Court stated, “The Puerto 
Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising 
restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the 
residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product 
advertised.  We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .”62  
Deciding the fourth prong, the Court simply stated that “it is up to the 
legislature to decide whether [less restrictive alternatives] would be as 
effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on 
advertising.”63 
The Court in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.64 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island65 rebuked the deferential standard applied in Posadas.66  
Adopting similar interpretations of the Central Hudson test, the Court 
vigorously reviewed the government’s evidence and tailoring under the third 
 
 58 478 U.S. at 330–32 (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 59 See generally supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 60 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340–41. 
 61 Id. at 341 (upholding the government’s argument that gambling by its residents, but not by tourists, 
leads to an “increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the 
infiltration of organized crime” (quoting Brief for Appellees at 37, Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (No. 84-1903)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 62 Id. at 341–42 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.  
Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its 
sales.” (quoting Cent. Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 63 Id. at 344. 
 64 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 65 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 66 See id. at 510–14 (Stevens, J.) (following the reasoning in Coors and refuting two of the State’s core 
arguments adopted from the Posadas opinion); Coors, 514 U.S. at 487 (reversing the deferential standard 
espoused in Posadas and placing the burden on the government to show “that the challenged regulation 
advances the Government’s interest ‘in a direct and material way’”).  The conclusory rationale offered in 
Posadas, that the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to 
ban advertising of casino gambling, was also refuted in Coors.  See id. at 482 n.2. 
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and fourth prongs.67  The deferential standard espoused in Posadas has been 
similarly disregarded and chastised by commentators.68 
The strict analysis requiring strong government evidence and independent 
judicial review adopted by the Court in Coors and 44 Liquormart may have 
been relaxed in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly—the most recent Supreme 
Court decision on commercial speech and most directly related to the current 
tobacco litigation under the FSPTCA.69  In Lorillard, the Massachusetts 
Attorney General, unhappy with the tobacco restrictions imposed in the Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA),70 expanded tobacco advertising regulation to 
“close holes” in the settlement and “to stop Big Tobacco from recruiting new 
customers among the children of Massachusetts.”71  The state regulations, 
which covered cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars, prohibited outdoor 
advertising within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or playground.72  The 
regulations also required point-of-sale advertising to be placed five feet or 
higher in retail operations open to minors and covered by the 1,000-foot rule.73  
While the Court ultimately struck down these two advertising restrictions, the 
 
 67 See infra Part II.C. 
 68 Commentators have derided Posadas as a poor attempt to apply the Central Hudson test in any 
meaningful way.  See, e.g., Terrence Leahy, A Game of Chance: Commercial Speech After Posadas, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 1, 1988, at 58, 61 (“The concept that a right to restrict speech is merely a lesser included power of the 
right to regulate conduct . . . is fundamentally at odds with many years of First Amendment jurisprudence.”); 
Gary Weeks, Case Note, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico: Promising 
Precedent for Proponents of Tobacco Advertising Prohibition?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 877, 889 (1987) (arguing that 
Central Hudson’s restrictions on government regulation of free speech were not applied in Posadas). 
 69 Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525, 557–59 (2001). 
 70 In 1998, forty-six states and the four largest U.S. tobacco companies entered into the Master 
Settlement Agreement, restricting tobacco advertisement and promotion while paying the states $206 billion 
over twenty-five years in exchange for dismissal of pending litigation against the tobacco companies.  Master 
Settlement Agreement (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf.  Under the 
agreement, tobacco advertisements are banned on billboards, in sports stadiums, shopping malls, and on 
promotional products like shirts and hats or in movies or television shows.  Id. § III(c)–(f).  Since the 
advertising and promotional restrictions were self-imposed, the agreement does not infringe on the First 
Amendment’s commercial speech protections.  See generally Lori Ann Luka, Note, The Tobacco Industry and 
the First Amendment: An Analysis of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 297 (1999–
2000) (arguing that tobacco companies that did not enter the MSA cannot be held to its terms without 
infringing on their First Amendment commercial speech rights). 
 71 David S. Modzeleski, Note, Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly: Are We Protecting the Integrity of the First 
Amendment and the Commercial Free Speech Doctrine at the Risk of Harming Our Youth?, 51 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 987, 1004 (2002) (quoting Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 533) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the 
MSA’s failure to protect youth from the hazards of smoking and Massachusetts’s subsequent attempt to further 
restrict tobacco advertising). 
 72 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 21.04(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2000). 
 73 Id. § 21.04(5)(b). 
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tight Court split and differing opinions about the proper constitutional analysis 
pervaded the Court’s opinion.74 
Whatever its past justifications, the judiciary is now faced with a 
remarkable dilemma: protecting the country’s children from the single most 
dangerous product in America or defending one of our most cherished 
constitutional rights and the public’s right to be informed.75 
II. A CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS OF SELECTED FSPTCA PROVISIONS AND 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO BRING THOSE PROVISIONS WITHIN THE 
PROVINCE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Part analyzes the merits of the tobacco companies’ suit in 
Commonwealth Brands as those facts apply to the four Central Hudson prongs.  
Section A discusses the first prong and whether tobacco advertising is lawful 
and nonmisleading—concluding that tobacco advertising should be subject to 
First Amendment protection.  Section B follows, proposing that the 
government has a substantial interest in reducing youth smoking under Central 
Hudson’s second prong. 
 
 74 The Court rejected the tobacco companies’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply to content-based 
regulations.  Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554.  However, several Justices had certain qualms with the malleable 
application of the Central Hudson test.  Id. (pointing to past opinions where Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg each doubted Central Hudson’s application in particular circumstances).  These 
questions about Central Hudson’s viability are not new—similar arguments were discussed in Greater New 
Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) (noting scholars’, amici’s, and other 
judges’ arguments to abandon Central Hudson’s test in favor of a more objective and less malleable test, but 
ultimately concluding that Central Hudson “provides an adequate basis for decision”).  See generally Michael 
Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact 
of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 267 (2003) (discussing the evolution of commercial speech 
doctrine following Central Hudson and leading up to Lorillard).  Supreme Court Justices are not alone in 
questioning the suitability of tests like Central Hudson’s as an appropriate method for decision making.  See 
generally JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 52–53 (2003) (noting that the legal model of judicial decision making serves “only to rationalize 
the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decision-making process”). 
 75 The Court has often acknowledged the importance of the First Amendment in relation to the need for 
regulations that benefit the public.  Justice Stevens noted that other Justices 
expressed “doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a 
legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to ‘dampen’ the demand for or use 
of the product.”  Indeed, Justice Blackmun believed that even “though ‘commercial’ speech is 
involved, such a regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.” 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 n.10 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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Considering the variety and number of restrictions in the Act, this 
Comment analyzes a select group of problematic provisions.76  Section C 
focuses on the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs.  This section starts by 
outlining the current standards for each of the prongs.  The section follows 
with an analysis of their application to the selected FSPTCA provisions, as 
well as proposed amendments that would help the restrictions adhere to the 
First Amendment standards espoused by Central Hudson. 
A. Central Hudson’s First Prong: Nonmisleading Commercial Speech 
The tobacco advertising subject to FDA regulation under the FSPTCA 
easily meets Central Hudson’s first prong because it is nonmisleading and 
lawful commercial speech, and thus entitled to First Amendment protection.77 
Faced with a constitutional challenge to the FSPTCA, the FDA is 
confronted with a challenge analogous to the one in Lorillard.  With no 
analysis, the Lorillard Court quickly stated that the first Central Hudson prong 
was easily satisfied.78  Lorillard is not alone in broadly construing what speech 
is nonmisleading.  For example, in Pearson v. Shalala, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that unsubstantiated claims made on product 
labels were lawful and nonmisleading and entitled to Central Hudson review.79  
There, dietary-supplement manufacturers made health-related claims about 
folic acid with no evidence to back their claims.80  Applying the first Central 
Hudson prong in that context, the Pearson court differentiated “inherently 
misleading” and “potentially misleading” claims, subjecting the latter to 
Central Hudson analysis.81  Even though no evidence supported the claims, the 
court found the labeling only potentially misleading.82 
Despite the firm precedent establishing First Amendment protection,83 the 
FDA argues that tobacco advertisements are misleading because they depict 
 
 76 See infra Part II.C.1–5. 
 77 See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554–55 (majority opinion). 
 78 Id. at 555. 
 79 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 80 Id. at 108–09. 
 81 Id. at 113. 
 82 Id. (ultimately failing the fourth prong because there were less restrictive alternatives). 
 83 Though not argued here, it is clear that the government’s long-argued “vice” rationale is no longer 
viable.  See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513–14 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (rejecting 
Posadas’s “vice” rationale); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995) (refuting the 
government’s argument that Posadas created an exception to the Central Hudson test because that reasoning 
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young and healthy smokers in spite of extensive evidence linking tobacco use 
to death and disease.84  This argument is misplaced because the advertisements 
are not “inherently misleading.”  First, tobacco companies are required to put 
warning labels on all their packaging and advertisements.85  Second, though 
advertisements may depict happy young people—like any product—the 
advertisement merely tries to stress the product’s positive attributes.86 
Persisting further, the FDA argues that such advertisements are illegal 
because they are aimed at minors, whose purchase of tobacco products is an 
illegal transaction.87  This argument, however, goes too far.  If the Court were 
to allow the government to engage in this slippery slope, regulators could ban 
any advertising of activities that are not legal to certain segments of the 
population; for instance, driving a car, purchasing a gun, voting, or drinking 
alcohol. 
The Court has always adopted a broad stance on what speech is protected 
as nonmisleading under the First Amendment, and as held in Lorillard, tobacco 
advertisements are no exception.  Like other forms of advertising that 
showcase a company’s product in a positive light, tobacco advertisements are 
subject to the same First Amendment protection afforded all other commercial 
speech.  If the Court embraced the FDA’s narrow view, the government would 
hold virtually unrestricted power in regulating undesirable speech it deems 
misleading.88 
 
was dicta, made after Central Hudson was applied).  See generally Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (rejecting the 
argument that strict scrutiny should be the appropriate standard for commercial speech). 
 84 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,471. 
 85 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the warning label restrictions implemented by 
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)). 
 86 But see Charles J. Harder, Comment, Is It Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical Analysis of the 1995 
FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and 
Adolescents, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 399, 417 (1995). 
 87 But see Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 n.3 (W.D. Ky. 2010) 
(rejecting the government’s argument that advertising reaching minors would be unlawful, failing the first 
Central Hudson prong). 
 88 Cf. Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001) (referring to the settled principle that 
“disclaimers are ‘constitutionally preferable to outright suppression’” in coming to the conclusion that 
products that are only potentially misleading can be remedied with disclaimers rather than suppression of 
advertising (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999))); Richard A. Samp, Courts Are 
Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech Regulation, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 313, 
319–23 (2003) (describing the Court’s position on “inherently misleading” commercial speech and the 
government’s ability to completely ban such speech). 
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After the speech at issue passes the first prong, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove the regulations further a substantial government interest, 
directly advance the stated substantial interest, and are not more extensive than 
necessary in furthering that interest.89 
B. Central Hudson’s Second Prong: Substantial Government Interest 
The FDA should have no difficulty satisfying the second prong, that 
furtherance of the FSPTCA promotes a substantial government interest.  The 
Supreme Court decided a strikingly similar issue in Lorillard.90  The 
Massachusetts Regulations there were based solely on the 1996 FDA 
regulations that are the substance of the FSPTCA’s advertising restrictions 
here.91  Swiftly analyzing the second prong, the Lorillard Court noted that no 
party contested the State’s substantial interest in “preventing the use of tobacco 
products by minors.”92 
Moreover, the Lorillard Court is one among many to promptly accept the 
government’s position on the second prong; several other cases similarly give a 
remarkable amount of deference to the government’s decision to regulate in a 
given area.  For example, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act (FAAA) prohibited beer manufacturers from disclosing 
alcohol content on their labels or advertising.93  The Court found a substantial 
interest in preventing “strength wars,” a term used to describe the theory that 
consumers may choose a beer solely based on its high potency, leading to 
“greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs.”94 
Relying on similar reasoning, the district court in Pearson accepted the 
FDA’s argument that it had a substantial interest in protecting uninformed 
consumers from unsubstantiated health claims.95  Ironically, it seems that the 
court was willing to give broad First Amendment protection by finding the 
 
 89 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  The Court has 
disavowed a possible “vice exception” to First Amendment commercial speech protection, an argument the 
government has used in the past to shift the burden of proof.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 90 See Lorillard v. Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001). 
 91 Id. at 557. 
 92 Id. at 555. 
 93 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (citing FAAA, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–211 
(1982) (amended 1988)). 
 94 Id. at 485–86; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (Stevens J.) 
(noting substantial government interest in temperance); 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,472–74 
(articulating the FDA’s position regarding Central Hudson’s second prong). 
 95 Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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claims nonmisleading, yet utilized the same unsubstantiated health-claims 
argument to give merit to the FDA’s interest in protecting consumers from 
misinformation.96 
As described in the FSPTCA,97 Congress’s purpose in granting FDA 
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco is to reduce youth tobacco use, making the 
outcome of this prong relatively straightforward after Lorillard.98  Moreover, 
the Act focuses on the ill effects of adult use, general tobacco dependence, and 
full information regarding “modified risk” tobacco products.99  Applying the 
uninformed-consumer-base problem in Pearson, these motivations give the 
FDA’s argument further credence under the second prong.  The substantial 
interest in complete information is additionally persuasive when viewed in 
light of the fact that the nation’s youth continue to become addicted to tobacco 
even though the dangers of smoking have been known for more than forty 
years.100  The government surely has a substantial interest in protecting the 
public’s interest in making informed decisions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lorillard firmly establishes the Court’s 
trend in Central Hudson jurisprudence under the second prong.101  As a result, 
the FDA’s substantial interests in preventing consumer misinformation and 
reducing underage tobacco consumption should pass the second prong. 
 
 96 Compare to the district court’s treatment regarding the first Central Hudson prong, supra notes 79–80 
and accompanying text. 
 97 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 98 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111–31, §§ 2–3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776–82 (2009) (describing congressional 
findings and the purposes of the FSPTCA); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 
230 (describing the effects of youth smoking on adult smoking and noting that “well over 80 percent of 
adolescents who smoked half a pack a day or more as seniors in high school . . . were smoking five to six years 
later as young adults”). 
 99 FSPTCA § 2 (describing Congress’s findings regarding the justifications for the FDA’s tobacco 
regulation through the FSPTCA); see also id. § 2(37) (“The costs to society of the widespread use 
of . . . modified risk products that do not in fact reduce risk or that increase risk include thousands of 
unnecessary deaths and injuries and huge costs to our health care system.”). 
 100 But see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 135 (finding that “virtually all U.S. 
adolescents—smokers and nonsmokers alike—are aware of the long-term health effects of smoking” but 
choose to smoke anyway “because many adolescents feel inherently invulnerable”). 
 101 Potentially realizing this, the plaintiffs devoted one sentence to disputing this issue in their complaint, 
but provided no support to their argument that the government lacks a substantial interest.  Complaint, supra 
note 35, at 30.  The district court opinion thus did not address the second prong.  See Commonwealth Brands, 
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
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C. Central Hudson’s Third and Fourth Prongs and an Analysis of Select 
FSPTCA Provisions 
The first two Central Hudson prongs generally apply to an entire piece of 
legislation, rather than individual provisions, because the speech being 
regulated and the substantial interest being served usually apply across the 
entirety of a statute.  The last two prongs are provision specific, however, and 
this section will thus give a brief overview of the modern application standards 
for the third and fourth prongs before offering a more detailed analysis of the 
selected FSPTCA provisions and proposed amendments to each. 
Most of the FSPTCA provisions at issue pass the third Central Hudson 
prong because they directly advance the government’s substantial interest in 
reducing underage smoking.  For the government to prevail, it must show more 
than mere “speculation or conjecture”102 by providing evidence that the 
regulation will advance its substantial interest “to a material degree.”103  It is 
thus imperative for the government to establish a link between tobacco 
marketing and increased underage consumption104 because repeated judicial 
opinions have refused to afford deference to the government’s “commonsense” 
judgments.105 
As supportive evidence, the 1996 regulations adopted by the FSPTCA 
describe extensive studies showing the effect of advertising on youth 
consumption of tobacco products.106  While this evidence correctly departs 
 
 102 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)). 
 103 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Edenfield v. 
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[A] commercial speech regulation ‘may 
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.’” (quoting 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980))); see also Lorillard, 533 
U.S. at 557–61 (finding that the Massachusetts regulations adopting the evidence provided in the 1996 FDA 
regulations were sufficient to fulfill the government’s burden under the third Central Hudson prong). 
 104 See Gerald W. Griffin, Note, Looking Past a Smoke Screen: A First Amendment Analysis of the Food 
and Drug Administration’s Rule Restricting Tobacco Advertising, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 363, 371 (1997). 
 105 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.  The FDA argued in favor of deference in its 1996 
regulations, which are now adopted by the FSPTCA.  See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,474. 
 106 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,474–81 (noting studies establishing a correlative link between 
anthropomorphic characters like “Joe Camel” and youth smoking, as well as R.J. Reynolds’s in-house study to 
use similar characters to expand its young market (eighteen- to twenty-year-old smokers)).  Even highly 
suggestive Joe Camel advertisements are not without controversy concerning a causal connection to underage 
consumption.  See Griffin, supra note 104, at 371 (describing FDA studies admitting that no causal connection 
between the advertising and underage consumption exists despite the clear intuition behind such an argument). 
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from the government’s early reliance on common sense107 and tends to show 
that the advertising restrictions directly advance the government’s interest in 
reducing youth tobacco use,108 the government still must show that the 
regulations as a whole are consistent and coherent with regard to the 
government’s substantial interest.109 
The biggest obstacle facing the FSPTCA’s advertising provisions is the 
fourth Central Hudson prong, because the scope of the regulations is out of 
proportion with the interest served in preventing underage tobacco use.  The 
fourth prong asks whether the FSPTCA provisions are more extensive than 
necessary to further the goal of reducing underage tobacco use.110  This 
requires a case-by-case inquiry and “a reasonable fit between the means and 
ends of the regulatory scheme” imposed by the Act.111  The fit need not be 
perfect, but the scope of the regulations must be “‘in proportion to the interest 
served’; that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . [is] 
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”112  The restrictions also 
must be imposed through careful calculation of “the costs and benefits 
associated with the burden on speech imposed by the regulations.”113 
Applied in this context, the Court looks at the extent to which the 
regulation infringes on the speech rights of both the regulated entities and the 
 
 107 The plaintiffs, and some commentators, disagree with Lorillard, arguing that the provided evidence 
fails to establish a causal link to underage teen smoking.  See Complaint, supra note 35, at 33 (arguing that the 
Surgeon General’s reports show that almost all U.S. adolescents are aware of the dangers of smoking but 
choose to smoke anyway because they feel inherently invulnerable); 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,487 
(acknowledging claims that its cited report does not establish a causal relationship between advertising and 
smoking, and addressing comments from trade associations and tobacco companies, which argue that 
advertising does not have a material effect on youth decisions to smoke). 
 108 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566–67 (striking the advertising restrictions under the third and fourth 
prongs).  The FDA, however, does not blindly rely on such studies to prove a causative link between 
advertising and tobacco use.  1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,476 (arguing the studies provide “useful 
insight into how advertising affects smoking behavior and when considered with other studies provide 
sufficient support for the agency’s conclusions”). 
 109 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (striking down a 
regulation on private casino advertising that left Native American casinos unaffected, thus not directly 
advancing the substantial interest in curbing the social ills attributed to gambling). 
 110 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 111 E.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561. 
 112 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting In re R. 
M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)); id. at 479–80 (discussing cases in which the Court deferred to the 
legislature’s reasonable judgment). 
 113 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 
(1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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public,114 and whether the government could employ less restrictive 
alternatives that would further its substantial interest.115  The Court is 
especially wary of absolute advertising bans that completely restrict consumers 
from lawful product information.116 
1. Black-and-White Text Requirement 
The black-and-white text requirement, which prohibits tobacco advertising 
or labeling unless the advertisement consists of only black text on a white 
background, will likely be struck down under the Central Hudson test.  
Though the provision appears to pass muster under Central Hudson’s third 
prong, it is not narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest in 
reducing underage tobacco use under the fourth prong.  While the FSPTCA 
provisions do not allow the FDA to lift the black-and-white requirement,117 
there are a number of alternatives Congress can adopt to narrowly tailor the 
provisions, such as expanding the range of publications excepted from the ban 
and making a distinction between advertisements aimed at minors and those 
directed specifically to adults. 
Likely satisfying the third prong, the black-and-white restrictions directly 
advance the government’s interest in reducing youth tobacco consumption 
because color imagery is an important tool for advertisers, and without it, 
tobacco advertisements may be less effective and have less influence on 
adolescents.118  Often referred to as tombstone advertising, the FSPTCA 
prohibits tobacco-product advertising or labeling unless the advertisement 
consists of “only black text on a white background.”119  This restriction applies 
to all advertisements except those in “an adult publication” or adult-only 
 
 114 See, e.g., id. 
 115 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995). 
 116 See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–63; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 
(1996) (Stevens, J.). 
 117 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009) (adopting the 1996 final rule and precluding 
any amendment to the 1996 final rule, except as expressly contemplated in the FSPTCA); Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and 
Adolescents, 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Final Rule]. 
 118 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (finding 
children highly influenced by color and imagery because they are unlikely to inquire further than an 
advertisement’s images and are subject to more social pressure than adults). 
 119 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2) (adopting 21 C.F.R. § 897 (1997)); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, 
§ 1140.32. 
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facility.120  Adult publications are defined as having less than 15% youth 
readership and less than two million total readers under age eighteen.121  Adult-
only facilities can only use color advertisements that are attached to a fixture in 
the facility and that cannot be seen from outside.122 
The Lorillard opinion is instructive here because the Massachusetts statute 
there adopted the same 1996 FDA regulations at issue in the FSPTCA.123  The 
Lorillard Court departed significantly from the rigorous review applied by the 
Court in Coors and 44 Liquormart, relaxing the extensive government 
evidence required to satisfy the third prong.124  Though the studies cited in the 
FDA regulations predominantly applied to cigarettes, the Court liberally 
construed the evidence to apply to cigars and smokeless tobacco.125  The Court 
also recognized an implied relationship between advertising and consumer 
demand, concluding that “suppressed advertising may have the opposite 
effect.”126 
Recent Court decisions lend credence to the government’s argument that 
restricting color and imagery from advertising will further its substantial 
interest in reducing underage tobacco use.  Without color and graphics, 
 
 120 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(d) (1997)); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 
117, § 1140.32(a)(2). 
 121 See sources cited supra note 120.  Under this definition, magazines like Sports Illustrated, People, and 
ESPN the Magazine would fail to qualify as adult publications because they have more than two million youth 
readers, despite having less than 15% youth readership.  See Complaint, supra note 35, at 13. 
 122 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2). 
 123 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–58 (2001).  The Court only applied the Central 
Hudson test to cigars and smokeless tobacco because the Massachusetts regulations were preempted as they 
applied to cigarettes.  Id. at 541 (“No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be 
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which 
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 124 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505, 507 (1996) (Stevens, J.); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487–89 (1995). 
 125 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558–59 (using the FDA’s findings that “considered several studies of tobacco 
advertising and trends in the use of various tobacco products”). 
 126 Id. at 557.  Despite the Court’s lenient standard, six Justices agreed that the regulation banning point-
of-sale advertisements positioned less than five feet from the floor failed the third prong.  Id. at 566–67.  
Justice O’Connor dismissed the regulation’s logic because “[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those 
who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings,” showing that the regulations did 
not logically advance the government’s interest.  Id. (“Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco 
advertisements and displays that entice children, much like floor-level candy displays in a convenience store, 
but the blanket height restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal.”). 
SHECHTMAN GALLEYSFINAL 3/24/2011  12:07 PM 
2011] SMOKING OUT BIG TOBACCO 727 
advertisements will likely be less effective, especially to children, who are 
arguably more susceptible to idealized imagery.127 
Despite satisfying the third prong, the tombstone provision likely fails the 
fourth prong because it is broader than necessary to further the government’s 
substantial interest.  The FDA achieves its goal of reducing underage smoking 
only by “camouflaging tobacco advertisements in black-and-white text, in an 
effort to delegitimize smoking” to all consumers.128  In support of its argument, 
the FDA maintains that “consumers will lose little utility from these particular 
advertising restrictions” because meaningful information is still allowed to be 
distributed through nonmisleading printed words.129  The FDA further 
contends that the restrictions will not impose significant burdens on the 
distribution or receipt of information because it will coordinate with other 
public health agencies to “disseminat[e] truly important consumer safety 
information.”130 
The FDA’s paternalistic arguments are misplaced given the Supreme 
Court’s extension of First Amendment protection to color and imagery.131  And 
while the tombstone requirement is not a complete ban,132 the very limited 
adult publication and facility exceptions make it a short step to an all-
encompassing ban, thereby instigating closer review under Central Hudson.133  
The Court has also repeatedly intimated that the government may not regulate 
speech by arbitrarily choosing the speech it sees fit for public consumption.134  
 
 127 Tobacco trade associations argue this point in the fourth prong: color and imagery “are prerequisites 
for disseminating relevant quality information,” without which “consumers could not be adequately informed 
about the merits of new products.”  1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,591. 
 128 Griffin, supra note 104, at 398. 
 129 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,591 (conceding that imagery may be important for tobacco sales). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985) (finding that the government 
may not forego the difficulty of distinguishing between advertisements aimed at the proposed substantial 
interest simply because it is more convenient to implement a prophylactic rule). 
 132 The district court in Commonwealth Brands focused on this point, noting that the “‘blanket ban’ on all 
uses of color and images in tobacco labels and advertising has a ‘uniformly broad sweep . . . [that] 
demonstrates a lack of tailoring.’”  Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 526 
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001)). 
 133 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing that the adult magazines excepted from the regulation 
would exclude major adult-focused publications, reducing the exception to a marginal audience); supra note 
116 and accompanying text.  The district court rejected this argument because the plaintiffs did not provide 
evidence that an alternative definition of adult publication would be better tailored.  Commonwealth Brands, 
678 F. Supp. 2d at 525.  The burden, however, is on the FDA to show less restrictive alternatives do not exist. 
 134 See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564 (noting that adult consumers have a right to receive information 
about lawful products); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (indicating 
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The FDA’s rationalization that it will decide what consumer information is 
“truly important” is an insult to the First Amendment. 
Congress can amend the black-and-white text provisions by expanding the 
range of publications and facilities allowed to convey tobacco advertisements 
containing color and imagery.  As they stand now, the restrictions are broader 
than necessary to limit underage tobacco use because an adult who does not 
read qualified adult-only magazines or frequent bars and nightclubs will be 
completely removed from colored advertising promoted by tobacco companies 
and retailers.  An integral first step is to increase or remove the two-million-
youth-subscriber element.  Another plausible option would be expanding the 
exceptions to include tobacco-only facilities or allowing retailers to implement 
“adult-only” barriers like those required for smokeless-tobacco sample 
distribution.135 
Congress should also impose more probative requirements on the FDA, 
thereby properly accounting for lawful consumers and their First Amendment 
rights while still furthering the substantial interest of protecting the nation’s 
youth from the risks of tobacco addiction and its attendant diseases.  To do 
this, Congress could require the FDA to distinguish advertisements that 
influence minors from those directed solely toward the adult population on a 
case-by-case basis.  For instance, the FDA could delineate between 
advertisements showing young, attractive people in a fun atmosphere or 
anthropomorphic characters like Joe Camel, and advertisements aimed toward 
older segments of the population.  While clearly a burdensome task, the 
Supreme Court requires the government to expend the resources necessary to 
protect the First Amendment.136  These further alterations would make the 
restrictions more narrowly tailored to the substantial interest of reducing 
underage tobacco use and less like a complete ban. 
2. Restriction on Modified Risk Tobacco Product Advertising 
The restrictions on modified risk tobacco products may fail both the third 
and fourth Central Hudson prongs.  A more coherent policy would place 
modified risk tobacco products on at least a level playing field with traditional 
 
that “a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy” aimed at the 
regulated activity). 
 135 See infra Part II.C.5 (describing the regulations for smokeless-tobacco sample distribution). 
 136 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646. 
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cigarettes, giving more credence to the positive health implications of a 
reduced-tobacco (or nicotine) product.137 
The FSPTCA defines a modified risk tobacco product as “any tobacco 
product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-
related disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.”138  
Tobacco companies are prohibited from “us[ing] the descriptors ‘light,’ ‘mild,’ 
or ‘low,’”139 or directing statements to the public “that would be reasonably 
expected to result in consumers believing that the tobacco product or its smoke 
may present a lower risk of disease or is less harmful” than other tobacco 
products.140  Manufacturers may only market modified risk tobacco products 
with advance FDA approval, which is to be provided only if the Secretary 
determines the product will “(A) significantly reduce harm and the risk of 
tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users; and (B) benefit the health 
of the population as a whole taking into account both users of tobacco products 
and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.”141 
Viewed in light of the FSPTCA as a whole, the modified risk provision 
may fail the third Central Hudson prong due to its inconsistent application.  
The government persuasively argues that products making unsubstantiated 
claims can create an insidious problem by persuading consumers to purchase 
purportedly healthier products, which may actually be just as dangerous as 
traditional cigarettes.142  Seen in this light, the FDA’s reasoning is similar to 
that upheld in Pearson v. Shalala, where the court found that government 
regulation of dietary supplements passed the third Central Hudson prong.143  
Though it deemed that unsubstantiated claims made by supplement distributors 
were nonmisleading, it held that this same lack of evidence merited the 
government’s interest in protecting consumers under the second prong.144  In 
this context, the government’s restriction on unsubstantiated health claims 
 
 137 See Joseph A. Page, Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products and Products That Treat Tobacco 
Dependence: Are the Playing Fields Level?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 41 (1998) (“It would not seem 
reasonable to permit the playing field to tilt in favor of the more hazardous product.  Indeed, the opposite 
would be more consistent with sound public health policy.”). 
 138 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 139 Id. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“or similar descriptors”). 
 140 Id. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 141 Id. § 387k(g)(1). 
 142 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(37), 123 Stat. 1776, 1780 (2009); supra note 99 and 
accompanying text (describing the government’s interest in protecting consumers against tobacco products that 
do not reduce risk as advertised). 
 143 See Pearson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 144 See supra notes 79–82, 95, and accompanying text. 
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directly advanced its substantial interest in protecting the veracity of consumer 
information.145  An analogous argument can be made here.  By eliminating 
tobacco manufacturers’ ability to make claims about the reduced nicotine, 
tobacco, or carcinogens in its products, consumers cannot make the 
misinformed assumption that these products are safe or safer than other 
tobacco products on the market. 
Upon further review, however, this provision may be inconsistently 
applied, as derided by the Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States.146  The Court there struck down a federal 
regulation banning broadcast advertising for casino gambling in New Orleans, 
where such gambling was legal.147  Because the restriction applied to private 
casino advertising, yet left Indian casinos unaffected, the provision was 
inconsistently applied and did not directly advance the government’s 
substantial interest in curbing the social ills created by gambling.148 
The FSPTCA is similarly problematic because modified risk tobacco 
products are strictly regulated, yet cigarettes making no health claims are 
subject to less stringent FDA review if they qualify under the Act’s 
“substantially equivalent” provision.149  To qualify for this special standard, a 
predicate tobacco product must have been on the market on or before February 
15, 2007,150 and the current product must have the same ingredient and design 
characteristics as the predicate product.151  In this vein, the substantial 
equivalence provision maintains the tobacco industry’s pre-FSPTCA status 
quo while imposing stringent controls over premarket review for modified risk 
tobacco products.152  These FSPTCA provisions are inconsistent and 
inappropriate to fix the nation’s health problems created by tobacco 
 
 145 Pearson, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
 146 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999). 
 147 Id. at 176–78.  The Court pointed out that “[s]ome form of gambling is legal in nearly every state.”  Id. 
at 186 n.5.  These legislative acts suggest that the government’s argument is not as strong when Congress has 
made it clear that despite harm, some activities have countervailing economic benefits that outweigh their 
attendant social costs.  See id. at 186 & n.5. 
 148 Id. at 190 (“The operation of [the regulation] and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by 
exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”). 
 149 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(3) (Supp. III 2009). 
 150 Id. § 387j(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 151 Id. § 387j(a)(3)(A)(i), (B).  If the product has different characteristics than the predicate product, it 
may still pass the substantial equivalence standard if the Secretary determines that “it is not appropriate to 
regulate the product . . . because the product does not raise different questions of public health.”  Id. 
§ 387j(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 152 See id. § 387j(a)(2). 
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consumption.153  This regulatory scheme creates “the absurd result that certain 
tobacco products—like low tar cigarettes or electronic cigarettes—would be 
exposed to the more onerous regulatory burdens . . . merely because they claim 
to be healthier alternatives to traditional tobacco products.”154 
The regulations at issue in Greater New Orleans, however, are 
distinguishable.  While those regulations were facially inconsistent by applying 
to one subset of the population but not another, the inconsistencies in the 
FSPTCA regulations implicated here are not as immediately apparent, and the 
FDA can at least make the argument that it has tested predicate products, 
making testing of their substantial equivalents unnecessary.  Given this 
distinction, the outcome under Central Hudson’s third prong could go either 
way.  Regardless, it is hard to ignore the fact that modified risk products are 
more strictly regulated than traditional tobacco cigarettes, yet may be less 
harmful. 
Congress needs to abolish the substantial equivalence provision if it has 
any intention of rectifying these contradictions.  Though Congress could relax 
the substantial equivalence application standards to include lower risk 
products, most of these products are new to the market and thus unable to pass 
such a review in any event.  Further, the current problem lies with the 
FSPTCA’s disincentive for tobacco companies to innovate and create healthier 
products.  In light of these perverse incentives, the better policy alternative 
would be to remove the substantial equivalence provision and place all tobacco 
products on a level playing field, starting with universal premarket review.155 
Even if the modified risk provision passes the third Central Hudson prong, 
it fails the fourth prong because it is more extensive than necessary to further 
the substantial interest in reducing the health risk of tobacco users, let alone 
underage consumption.  At first glance, the provision seems narrowly tailored 
by initially requiring tobacco companies to seek FDA approval before 
marketing modified risk tobacco products and instigating case-by-case FDA 
 
 153 See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 459 (arguing that the FSPTCA was negotiated between Congress and 
tobacco companies that made large contributions to political action committees); Kevin Gauntt Barker, 
Comment, Thank You for Regulating: Why Philip Morris’s Embrace of FDA Regulation Helps the Company 
but Harms the Agency, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (2009) (arguing that an initially rejected version of the 
FSPTCA, H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. (2007), is good for tobacco industry leaders like Philip Morris and bad for 
the Food and Drug Administration’s pursuit of tobacco control). 
 154 Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. FDA, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75 (D.D.C.) (enjoining FDA regulation of 
electronic cigarettes under the FDCA), aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 155 See Page, supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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evaluation.156  The provision nevertheless falls short by prohibiting the 
Secretary from granting approval unless the product will “benefit the health of 
the population as a whole.”157  This restriction requires the Secretary to take 
into account nonusers of tobacco, making it virtually impossible for a tobacco 
manufacturer to market a modified risk tobacco product that will benefit the 
nonsmoking population unless the product does not emit secondhand smoke.158  
Moreover, this restriction flatly prohibits tobacco companies from making 
truthful and easily quantifiable statements about the ingredient content of their 
products relative to other types and brands of tobacco products.159  It is 
important to recall that “the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state 
interests that seek to keep the people in the dark for what the government 
believes to be their own good.”160  The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in protecting consumers from advertising practices that misinform them 
of product attributes.161  But commercial speech related to nonmisleading 
tobacco advertising remains protected by the First Amendment so long as 
tobacco products remain lawful to adult consumers.162  The government thus 
cannot make overly broad restrictions on the distribution of tobacco product 
information. 
To rectify the tailoring problems inherent in these provisions, Congress 
must remove the requirement that a modified risk tobacco product be 
beneficial to the nonusing public.  To retain its significance, the regulation 
should still require the product to reduce harm to tobacco users.  This 
requirement would also narrowly tailor the provision to the users at which the 
substantial government interest is directed. 
 
 156 See FSPTCA § 387k(g)(1). 
 157 Id. § 387k(g)(1)(B); see also FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(37), 123 Stat. 1776, 1780 (2009). 
 158 This essentially limits possible product exceptions to smokeless tobacco products and electronic 
cigarettes (tobacco-free cigarettes that vaporize nicotine for smokers to inhale), which the FDA has tried to ban 
in separate litigation.  See Smoking Everywhere, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62. 
 159 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 2009). 
 160 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  See 
generally Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A 
Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 432 
(1997) (arguing that advertisements lead to better informed consumers). 
 161 See Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 162 The district court in Commonwealth Brands did not analyze this provision under a First Amendment 
analysis because the FDA has up to 360 days to review a modified risk tobacco product before making a 
decision, and the labeling restraint is not a restriction on free speech but on placing a product into interstate 
commerce.  Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533 (W.D. Ky. 2010) 
(refraining from issuing an advisory opinion and thus waiting for the FDA to make a decision until after the 
FDA’s 360-day time limit has elapsed). 
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From a public health standpoint it is undeniably important to take issue 
with the death and disease caused by secondhand smoke.  But the government 
cannot ban “light” or “reduced risk” tobacco smoke while allowing traditional 
secondhand smoke to continue to harm the public.163  The modified risk 
provision, coupled with the substantial equivalence exemption, ties the hands 
of new product manufacturers by requiring them to meet “new product” 
standards and prohibiting them from offering traditional tobacco users a 
possibly healthier alternative.164  These requirements amount to a near-
complete ban on speech related to reduced-risk products and must be revised to 
pass constitutional muster. 
3. The 1,000-Foot Outdoor Advertising Ban 
As already dictated by the Supreme Court in Lorillard, the 1,000-foot 
outdoor advertising ban violates Central Hudson’s fourth prong because it is 
more extensive than necessary to further the government’s interest in 
preventing underage tobacco consumption.165  Deciding the third prong in 
favor of the state, the Court concluded that the outdoor advertising ban directly 
advanced the government interest because the FDA regulations adopted by the 
state provided ample evidence that tobacco advertising is linked to underage 
tobacco consumption.166  Because this issue has largely been decided, this 
subsection will hereinafter focus on the fourth prong.167 
 
 163 Though lacking evidentiary support, it seems intuitive that the large majority of tobacco products meet 
the substantial equivalence standards while only those with possibly less harmful effects are subject to 
nonusers benefit standards. 
 164 See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 466 (“If a truly healthier cigarette were to be invented, the 2009 Act 
erects substantial hurdles which disincentivizes the investment needed to reach the market.”).  But cf. ELINOR 
DEVLIN ET AL., LOW TAR PRODUCT CATEGORY 1, 3–4 (2003) (finding that even though “low tar” products 
have been unanimously disproved as a “safer alternative” to traditional cigarettes, consumers continue to rely 
on such products for a healthier alternative to traditional tobacco products).  It is, however, important to note 
that new products like electronic cigarettes still contain nicotine, technically a tobacco product, yet are free 
from the harmful smoke and tar attributed to traditional cigarettes.  See E-Cigarette Benefits, E-CIGARETTES 
CHOICE, http://www.ecigaretteschoice.com/pages/Benefits.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  Yet, the FDA has 
sought to ban them; under the FSPTCA, e-cigarettes are considered a modified risk tobacco product, making 
their availability subject to FDA approval.  See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA and Public Health 
Experts Warn About Electronic Cigarettes (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm173222.htm; see also Craig A. Conway, FDA Takes on Electronic 
Cigarette Companies, HEALTH L. PERSP. (Aug. 2009), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/ 
(CC) ElecCig.pdf. 
 165 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001). 
 166 Id.; see also supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.  It is also interesting to note that the Court 
was closely split, 5–4, on the third Central Hudson prong.  Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561.  While the Court 
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To pass constitutional muster, the outdoor advertising restrictions must be 
more specifically tailored to reducing underage tobacco use while providing 
more adults with exposure to lawful outdoor advertising.  The FSPTCA adopts 
the 1996 federal regulations’ ban on outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 
feet of defined places where children congregate168—the same one adopted by 
the Massachusetts legislature169 and struck down in Lorillard.170  Because 
Massachusetts adopted the FDA regulations wholesale, without adapting them 
to the characteristics of the state, the restrictions were not narrowly tailored to 
further the state’s substantial interest in reducing underage use.171  Similarly 
troubling, the 1,000-foot restriction would result in an almost-complete ban on 
outdoor advertising in metropolitan areas.172 
In response to the analysis offered in Lorillard and the limited guidance set 
forth in Commonwealth Brands,173 the FDA has placed the outdoor advertising 
restriction on hold and is considering 
“several options” for altering the 1996 outdoor advertising provision, 
including limiting the prohibition . . . to only apply to billboards 
within 1,000 feet of elementary or secondary schools, or prohibiting 
signs or collections of advertisements greater than 14 square feet at 
 
composition has changed since 2001 with the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, the Court’s political ideology is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 167 The district court in Commonwealth Brands did not address this issue, however, because it found the 
issue was not ripe because the Secretary had until March 22, 2010, to issue a final regulation.  678 F. Supp. 2d 
at 536.  Ripeness, however, is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 168 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1 (Supp. III 2009) (adopting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,617, 
§ 897.30(b) (defining restricted areas as “the perimeter of any public playground[,] . . . elementary school, or 
secondary school”)). 
 169 See 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 21.04(5)(a) (2000). 
 170 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 565.  The district court in Commonwealth Brands noted that because the “ban is 
indistinguishable from the Massachusetts’ [sic] ban the Supreme Court struck down in Lorillard, Plaintiffs are 
undoubtedly right [that the outdoor advertising ban is unconstitutional].”  678 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
 171 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63 (“[A]lthough a State or locality may have common interests and 
concerns about underage smoking and the effects of tobacco advertisements, the impact of a restriction on 
speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place.”). 
 172 Id. at 562.  It is also important to note that the advertising ban is not limited to outdoor advertising 
such as billboards.  As noted in Commonwealth Brands’ complaint, retailers use tobacco advertising on their 
storefronts to entice customers into their store and hopefully to “trigger spontaneous purchase decisions of 
non-tobacco products.”  Complaint, supra note 35, at 24.  This is an important distinction, highlighting the fact 
that retailers advertise price and product with no intent to influence adolescents into making tobacco purchase 
decisions. 
 173 See supra note 167 (noting the issue is not ripe because under this provision the Secretary has yet to 
issue a final rule comporting with the First Amendment). 
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retail establishments located in close proximity to any elementary or 
secondary school.174 
As noted in Lorillard, the 1,000-foot restrictions will have very different 
effects depending on “whether a locale is rural, suburban, or urban.”175  An 
adult consumer seeking to receive truthful tobacco information would be hard-
pressed to find tobacco billboards in a city, while a similarly situated consumer 
in a rural area would find such information easily available.  Placing the 
burden on the FDA to apply a more subjective rule depending on population 
density would reconcile the disparity in teenagers’ abilities to view such 
advertising176 and assuage the restriction on adult consumers. 
The regulations should also aim to differentiate between manufacturer 
advertising targeted at influencing new product purchase decisions and 
advertising by retailers that highlights products within the store.177  Given that 
the FDA has failed to establish a link between retailer advertising and 
underage tobacco consumption, it is necessary to amend the current provisions 
to allow merchants to price-advertise.  Without such changes, it may not be 
possible to make a meaningful distinction between the FSPTCA and the 
Massachusetts regulations that failed the fourth Central Hudson prong in 
Lorillard.178 
4. Ban on Event Sponsorship and Promotional Products 
Though the promotional ban will likely pass muster under the third Central 
Hudson prong, it is probably more extensive than necessary to achieve the 
ascertained goal of reducing underage tobacco use.  To meet the requirements 
of the fourth prong, Congress should implement less restrictive alternatives 
like expanding the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act’s warning 
requirements to include merchandise, strictly enforcing merchandise purchase 
age requirements, and distinguishing between adult-only events and those 
likely to attract underage audiences. 
 
 174 C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41304, FDA FINAL RULE 
RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO 14 (2010) (quoting 
Request for Comment on Implementation of the FSPTCA, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,241, 13,242 (proposed Mar. 19, 
2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 175 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563. 
 176 Consider a person’s ability to view a billboard 1,000 feet away in a city surrounded by tall buildings 
and where a minor might not travel more than a few blocks in a given day.  Compare this with a rural teenager 
who travels a greater distance to schools and has a more unobstructed view of outdoor advertising. 
 177 See supra note 172. 
 178 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63. 
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Under the Secretary’s final rule, tobacco manufacturers may not 
“sponsor . . . any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or 
any entry or team in any event . . . [with any] indicia of product 
identification . . . identifiable with[] those used for any brand of cigarettes or 
smokeless tobacco.”179  The rule also prohibits distribution or marketing of any 
promotional item with a tobacco product’s “logo, symbol, motto, selling 
message,” or pattern.180  These provisions essentially ban tobacco 
manufacturers from marketing their brand name outside of magazines.181 
The promotional ban appears to directly advance the government’s 
substantial interest of reducing youth tobacco use because the underage 
population readily consumes tobacco merchandise and event sponsorship.182  It 
is conceivable that minors may even increase their tobacco consumption to 
fulfill the purchase requirements necessary to obtain these promotional 
products.  Also, products like lighters and matches are directly attributable to 
tobacco use and establish a clear connection between distribution and 
consumption.183  Adding to the government’s argument, tobacco merchandise 
and sponsorship advertising do not contain the health warnings otherwise 
required on packaging and product advertising, making the risks of tobacco use 
less recognizable.184  Considering the extent of event sponsorship through the 
wide reach of television and other media outlets, a restriction on tobacco 
promotion will undoubtedly lead to reduced youth tobacco use. 
Even though the required connection is likely made under the third prong, 
these restrictions may be more extensive than necessary because they 
unnecessarily restrict not only youth advertising and merchandise 
consumption, but lawful adult distribution as well.  While some underage 
consumers may get their hands on promotional products, these merchandise 
 
 179 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.34(c); see also FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a) (Supp. III 
2009). 
 180 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.34(a). 
 181 Id.  There are no exceptions to these restrictions. 
 182 Merchandise distribution, however, is directly aimed at adults and often requires proof of purchase or 
UPC labels.  Compare Age Filtering Software, CAMEL.COM, https://camel.tobaccopleasure.com/modules/ 
FooterLinks/AgeFiltering.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (encouraging age filtering software and also 
screening new users’ ages, including a forty-eight-hour waiting period to use the site), with Kurt M. Ribisl et 
al., A Content Analysis of Web Sites Promoting Smoking Culture and Lifestyle, 30 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 
64 (2003) (finding most web sites that promote smoking culture do not require age verification). 
 183 See Edward Sepe et al., Smooth Moves: Bar & Nightclub Tobacco Promotions That Target Young 
Adults, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 414, 415 (2002). 
 184 See Scott Sullivan, Note, Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising Restrictions Violate the First 
Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 782 (1997). 
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programs are directed at adults, where the vast majority of use lies.  These 
programs also require age verification to obtain promotional products.185  
While event sponsorship is generally aimed at all viewers, not just adults, the 
FSPTCA institutes a complete ban on sponsorship without considering less 
restrictive alternatives for adult-specific events.186 
In its summary judgment opinion, the district court in Commonwealth 
Brands, however, found the merchandising provisions sufficiently tailored, 
passing the fourth prong.187  The court relied on Congress’s finding that 
“[t]here is no way to limit the distribution of these items to adults only” and 
that the MSA was an ineffective solution to the problem.188  Agreeing with the 
FDA, the court deemed that even if such merchandise were not distributed to 
children, adult wearers would become “walking advertisements” and would be 
“very effective in creating the sense that tobacco use is widely accepted.”189  
Concluding its analysis, the court surmised that even though some advertising 
is for adult-only events, the advertising itself is distributed to the public and 
available to minors.190 
The district court’s analysis is comprehensive but unconvincing.  First, the 
court unduly deferred to Congress’s findings despite the Supreme Court’s 
explicit assertions in Coors and 44 Liquormart repudiating overt legislative 
deference.191  Further, the MSA’s ineffectiveness is not an adequate 
justification for adopting overbroad restrictions.  Second, the court’s reasoning 
that adults become walking tobacco advertisements perpetuating tobacco’s 
societal acceptance discounts the fact that smoking is accepted by Congress 
itself.  Several provisions within the FSPTCA highlight this discontinuity.  For 
instance, the modified risk products provision maintains the status quo for 
major tobacco manufacturers,192 and the FSPTCA’s limited confidentiality 
 
 185 Cf. supra note 182. 
 186 For example, Lorillard sponsors a gambling tournament in Las Vegas; participants must be over 
twenty-one, and minors are not allowed on the premises.  See Complaint, supra note 35, at 25. 
 187 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527–28 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
 188 Id. at 527 (alteration in original) (quoting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,526); id. at 524–26 
(refuting the plaintiff’s argument that the Act does not differentiate between adults and children).  The court 
cited two journal articles and a district court case that found tobacco companies increased their sponsorship 
budgets after signing the MSA.  Id. at 526–28.  Not only is this “proof” unconvincing, the argument that 
Congress found the MSA insufficient is not a relevant justification for implementing an overbroad restriction 
on commercial speech. 
 189 Id. at 527–28 (quoting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,526). 
 190 Id. at 527 n.4. 
 191 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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provision193—lauded for providing much needed transparency—is more 
protective of the tobacco industry than it is restrictive.  So long as such 
provisions continue to contradict the purpose of the FSPTCA, it remains 
difficult to make a compelling argument that advertising of lawful products 
explains children’s conception that tobacco use is widely accepted.  Third, the 
court’s argument that sponsorship of adult-only events is still available to 
minors belies the problem with these provisions.  For instance, casinos that 
advertise an adult-only event sponsored by a tobacco company are unlikely to 
direct their advertisements to children, and any advertising distributed solely 
“in-house” would be completely unavailable to minors.  In contrast, the 
assertion that most large sporting and musical events are widely available to 
the youth population is undoubtedly correct.  But commercial speech 
jurisprudence is also clear in requiring the government to undertake the 
difficulty of distinguishing between advertisements aimed at the proposed 
substantial interest and those otherwise caught within a broad prophylactic rule 
that infringes on the public’s First Amendment rights.194 
With regard to merchandise distribution, the FSPTCA could implement 
less restrictive alternatives like utilizing stricter age laws and extending the 
FCLAA’s warning requirements195 to include tobacco merchandise.  Though 
difficult to employ less restrictive alternatives for sponsorship because of the 
wide viewership of athletic events and concerts, Congress could narrowly 
tailor the restrictions to create exceptions for adult-only advertising venues like 
gambling or fighting events.  While such exceptions may be difficult to 
administer, it is up to Congress and the FDA to make such distinctions in order 
to uphold the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and 
lawful consumers. 
5. Prohibition on Free Sample Product Distribution 
The restrictions on free sample distribution may not pass the third Central 
Hudson prong because they are applied inconsistently between cigarettes and 
 
 193 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(c) (Supp. III 2009).  Despite this provision, tobacco companies are actually 
protected by the Freedom of Information Act, prescribing that manufacturers’ product information “shall not 
be disclosed” if their commercial interests are affected.  See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 461–62 & n.18 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 387f(c)) (arguing that the language in § 387f(c) “is an effort to trigger blanket secrecy 
under [Freedom of Information Act] exemption 3”).  For example, this issue would be implicated under the 
product testing provision of the FSPTCA.  FSPTCA § 387o(b)(1). 
 194 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 195 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
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smokeless tobacco products.  Similarly problematic under the fourth prong, 
these provisions give no justification for banning cigarette samples, yet provide 
a narrowly tailored alternative for smokeless tobacco products.  A simple 
solution to both problems is to bring cigarettes within the province of the 
exception provided for smokeless tobacco products. 
Section 387a–1(a)(2)(G) prohibits free sample distribution of “cigarettes, 
smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products,” with certain limited 
exceptions.196  Free sample distribution is only permitted for smokeless 
tobacco products in a “qualified adult-only facility.”197  To qualify as an adult-
only facility, a retailer cannot sell alcohol or be located across from a space 
used for youth activities, must contain an enclosed barrier for free sample 
distribution out of public view, and have a security guard to check the 
authenticity of consumers’ age identification.198 
The FDA has not provided a coherent justification for allowing a smokeless 
product exception under § 387a–1(a)(2)(G), yet placing an outright ban on 
cigarette and other smoking tobacco sample distribution.  One could imagine 
the argument that cigarettes are more dangerous to the public than smokeless 
tobacco products, which do not produce secondhand smoke and are only 
dangerous to the user.  The substantial government interest offered by the 
government, however, works to curb youth consumption.  Aiming to protect 
the public from secondhand smoke is a much broader interest and at odds with 
the rest of the Act, which allows for continued distribution of traditional 
smoking products.  For example, a strikingly disingenuous provision allows for 
distribution and continued use of menthol cigarettes while banning cloves and 
flavored cigarettes.199  Though only 2%–3% of teenagers use flavored 
cigarettes and cloves,200 25%–30% of the cigarettes sold in the United States 
 
 196 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(1). 
 197 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(2).  The Commonwealth 
Brands court held that free samples do not fall within the realm of First Amendment protection because they 
entail “the distribution of a product, not speech—and, even if thought of as a speech restriction, it would seem 
fully permissible as a restriction on price.”  Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 
538 (W.D. Ky. 2010).  Congress, however, did not restrain the distribution of tobacco products, as it is still 
lawful to sell and distribute them.  It is not clear that Congress sought to create a price restriction on free 
tobacco. 
 198 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(2). 
 199 FSPTCA § 387g(a)(1)(A). 
 200 See Teen Smoking Statistics, TEEN SMOKING, http://www.teensmoking.us/content/teen-smoking-
statistics.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
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are of a menthol variety.201  If the substantial interest sought by the FSPTCA 
were to protect the general public health, it is inconceivable that tobacco 
product distribution would still be a lawful activity.202  Though the advertising 
restrictions in Greater New Orleans more flagrantly disregarded the substantial 
government interest at hand,203 the arbitrary distinction between free samples 
of smokeless tobacco and cigarettes is problematic because it creates an 
incoherent gap between the product classes and thus calls into question 
§ 387a–1(a)(2)(G)’s viability under the third prong. 
The complete ban on tobacco sample distribution, save smokeless tobacco, 
is also more extensive than necessary to accomplish the government’s interest 
in reducing teen smoking.  In addition to the Court’s misgivings concerning 
complete bans,204 the disconnect between smoking and smokeless tobacco 
products underscores the problem with this provision.205  Completely 
restricting one class of products is clearly more rigorous than the qualified 
adult-only facilities exception created for smokeless tobacco products.  This 
juxtaposition begs the question: Are the requirements for smokeless-tobacco 
sample distributions not rigorous enough or are the regulations on all other 
tobacco products more extensive than necessary? 
A possible answer to this question may be drawn through analogy.  It has 
been shown that raising cigarette taxes will inhibit youth smoking by making it 
cost prohibitive.206  Free sample distribution to underage smokers could 
circumvent teenagers’ inability to fund their smoking habits.  Preventing free 
 
 201 See Daniel R. Brooks et al., Menthol Cigarettes and Risk of Lung Cancer, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
609, 609–10 (2003). 
 202 See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 138–39 (2000) (finding 
Congress’s repeated legislation enabling continued distribution of tobacco products precluded the FDA from 
regulating tobacco products). 
 203 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (finding that the statute 
aimed to protect the public from the social ills of gambling, yet failed to regulate Native American casinos); 
see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488–89 (1995) (finding that the statute failed the third 
Central Hudson prong due to incoherent and contradictory regulatory provisions). 
 204 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–63 (2001); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J.). 
 205 Compare FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) (Supp. III 2009) (amending 21 C.F.R. 
§ 897.16(d)(2)(A)–(B) (1997)), with id. (amending 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(d)(2)(C) (1997)). 
 206 See Sherry Emery et al., Does Cigarette Price Influence Adolescent Experimentation?, 20 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 261, 268–69 (2001) (finding that excise taxes are only a deterrent to advanced teen smokers, not lightly 
using experimenters).  For an economist’s viewpoint, see Steven M. Suranovic, An Economic Model of Youth 
Smoking: Welfare and Tax Effects 27 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://129.3.20.41/ 
eps/hew/papers/0511/0511003.pdf (“[T]he results show that much higher cigarette taxes . . . could reduce or 
eliminate teen smoking but the levels of taxes may need to be quite high.”). 
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sample distribution to underage consumers clearly extends from such an 
intuitive argument.  It is less certain, however, that underage consumers in 
search of cheap cigarettes would roam different locations in search of free 
samples.  It is even less clear that minors would skirt the qualified adult-only 
facilities provision by producing false identification to a police officer or 
security guard.207  Moreover, policy initiatives that include retailers in the fight 
against underage consumption and point-of-sale purchase have been successful 
where efforts to educate and promote legal tobacco distribution are long-term, 
community wide, and coupled with strict enforcement.208  The qualified adult-
only facility exception not only requires police officers to verify age 
identification, but also involves retailers by restricting where and how sample 
distribution displays must be erected.  It thus provides at least an initial step 
toward the retailer involvement that is necessary for a successful campaign 
against illegal tobacco sales. 
Without further justification, a blanket restriction on free sample 
distribution of cigarettes is more extensive than necessary to reduce teen 
smoking, and a qualified adult-only exception may be more properly tailored 
to the substantial interest at hand.  The safest amendment to § 387a–1(a)(2) 
would be to treat all smoking and smokeless tobacco products the same, curing 
the incoherent distinction between the two.  Adapting the current qualified 
adult-only facility exception to include smoking products also lifts the 
complete ban on free sample distribution and rectifies the provision’s current 
failure to comply with the fourth Central Hudson prong. 
6. Consequences of Unconstitutional Advertising Restrictions and the 
Remnants of the FSPTCA 
If the FSPTCA’s advertising restrictions unconstitutionally violate the First 
Amendment, then the rest of the Act will lose the ability to fulfill its stated 
purpose of reducing underage smoking—and ultimately the FDA’s capacity to 
improve public health.209  The FSPTCA’s most pertinent remaining provisions 
 
 207 Compare Emery et al., supra note 206 (finding new smokers get cigarettes from friends, ask others to 
buy cigarettes for them, or both), with U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 10 (“Illegal 
sales of tobacco products are common.  Active enforcement of age-at-sale policies by public officials and 
community members appears necessary to prevent minors’ access to tobacco.”). 
 208 See Jean L. Forster & Mark Wolfson, Youth Access to Tobacco: Policies and Politics, 19 ANN. REV. 
PUB. HEALTH 203, 225–27 (1998); Jeruchimowitz, supra note 160, at 439–40 (arguing for stricter enforcement 
of age restrictions and retailer enforcement laws). 
 209 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1781–82 (2009); see also 2010 Final Rule, 
supra note 117, § 1140.2. 
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would be the restrictions on new tobacco products,210 the prohibition on 
flavored tobacco products,211 inspection of tobacco manufacturer facilities,212 
and limited confidentiality of product ingredients.213  These provisions are 
universally impotent and contain considerable exceptions, notably consistent in 
maintaining the tobacco industry’s status quo.214  Considering the FDA’s 
substantial limitations on regulating existing tobacco products, losing the 
advertising provisions would be a catastrophic blow to the efficacy of the 
FSPTCA.  As evidence of such, the FDA is restricted from recalling cigarettes 
from the market,215 increasing the age limitation on tobacco purchase,216 or 
banning tobacco products entirely.217  The FDA is thus hobbled by the inability 
to truly reduce the harmful effects of tobacco products by directly restraining 
their supply. 
Tobacco use still contributes to at least 400,000 deaths in the United States 
each year.218  To combat this public health crisis without banning tobacco 
distribution entirely, the FDA must direct its efforts at consumer demand by 
regulating tobacco advertising that has ostensibly targeted the youth population 
for years.219  It is thus imperative that Congress amend the advertising 
provisions to comply with the First Amendment through Central Hudson. 
Several of the amendments proposed earlier in this Part argue for more 
narrowly tailored provisions that emphasize a regulatory scheme specifically 
aimed at combating underage tobacco consumption.  While such distinctions 
are difficult to make, a prophylactic rule banning all such communication 
creates an unwarranted and overly broad restriction on lawful communication 
between tobacco companies and consumers.220  This lawful communication is 
 
 210 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 211 Id. § 387g(a)(1). 
 212 Id. § 387e(g). 
 213 Id. § 387f(c). 
 214 See supra Part II.C.1–5. 
 215 FSPTCA § 387h(c) (requiring a “reasonable probability that a tobacco product contains a 
manufacturing or other defect not ordinarily contained in tobacco products on the market,” meaning tar, 
nicotine, carcinogens, and the risk of death and disease are not adequate reasons to recall a tobacco product). 
 216 Id. § 387f(d)(3)(A)(ii). 
 217 Id. § 387g(d)(3) (stating that “[b]ecause of the importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a 
regulation” the FDA may not ban cigarettes or smokeless tobacco from the market nor reduce their nicotine 
content to zero). 
 218 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 219 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(15)–(21), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777–78 (2009).  It is similarly 
questionable that the world’s largest purveyor of tobacco products, Philip Morris, is absent from this litigation 
and supported the FSPTCA’s adoption.  See Letter, supra note 36 (showing Altria’s support of the FSPTCA). 
 220 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985). 
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so valuable to the public welfare that regulators must bear the burden of 
“distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and 
the harmless from the harmful.”221  For the FDA to withstand the First 
Amendment challenges made in Commonwealth Brands, it must be prepared to 
take on the advertising issue in a case-by-case manner, abandoning the 
inhibitory measures that call the FSPTCA’s constitutionality into question. 
In addition to the specific proposals made earlier, there are several 
alternatives passed on by the FSPTCA that aim at the heart of reducing 
underage tobacco consumption and apply to all the Act’s restrictions, such as: 
implementing smoking cessation and tobacco education programs for children; 
increasing tobacco excise taxes; prosecuting underage use, possession, and sale 
to minors; and government-sponsored public service announcements aimed at 
reducing smoking.222  All of these alternatives have proven somewhat 
successful in reducing smoking.223  For example, government-sponsored 
advertisements aimed at informing the public of tobacco’s harmful effects 
were so successful in the 1960s that the tobacco industry agreed to take 
tobacco advertisements off the radio in exchange for in-kind removal of public 
service announcements.224 
 
 221 Id.; see also Luka, supra note 70, at 318 (“The First Amendment interests threatened by the regulation 
of tobacco advertising are considerably more substantial than many have recognized.”). 
 222 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 31; see also 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,491–92 (recognizing 
the need to implement some alternative programs in addition to the tobacco advertising and access 
restrictions).  This is not to say that regulatory authorities have paid no heed to the efficacy of additional 
restrictions.  These controls, however, are generally only being considered in addition to the advertising 
restrictions considered in this Comment.  For example, the FDA and the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services have issued draft guidance for proposed regulations instituting civil money penalties and 
“No-Tobacco-Sale Orders” against retailers who fail to comply with the FSPTCA.  See CTR. FOR TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND TOBACCO RETAILERS: 
CIVIL PENALTIES AND NO-TOBACCO-SALE ORDERS FOR TOBACCO RETAILERS 5–11 (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM224464.p
df. 
 223 For example, a study promoted by the National Cancer Institute argues that smoking cessation 
advertising restrictions should be less rigorous in light of the success of direct-to-consumer advertising and 
smoking cessation products’ ability to help smokers quit.  Rosemary Avery et al., Regulating Advertisements: 
The Case of Smoking Cessation Products, 31 J. REG. ECON. 185, 203–04 (2007).  The FDA cited other 
countries’ restrictions on tobacco advertising and the positive youth impact they have had.  See 1996 Final 
Rule, supra note 7, at 44,491–92.  Yet those countries included the alternatives discussed above in conjunction 
with the advertising restrictions to achieve such progress.  Id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 184, at 774–75. 
 224 See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588–89 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that tobacco companies agreed to be taken off the airwaves in exchange for removal of public service 
announcements, which led to later increases in tobacco consumption), aff’d sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. 
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Kieindienst, 405 U.S. 
1000 (1972). 
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In Commonwealth Brands, the district court generally disagreed that less 
restrictive alternatives are worthwhile.225  After listing several things the 
government has done that did not reduce underage consumption, the court 
found the alternatives “notable for the extent to which they would impose 
substantial new costs on state and local governments and private persons . . . to 
counter the impact that [Plaintiffs’] billions of dollars of advertising has on 
youth.”226  This argument simply ignores the Court’s requirement imposed in 
Zauderer, that the government must expend the resources necessary to protect 
the First Amendment.227  In addition to the evidence showing alternatives that 
reduce underage use, the district court disregarded the most blatant statistic 
indicating that these alternatives do work: smoking rates have continually 
decreased over the past fifty years.228  The fact that teens continue to take up 
smoking does not provide carte blanche for the government to impose 
sweeping commercial speech restrictions.  Ultimately, the First Amendment 
gives consumers a right to be informed about the products they are consuming 
and the public is better off for it.229  As long as tobacco is legally sold and 
distributed in the United States, the public has a right to the information 
applicable to the tobacco products they consume.  Indeed, Congress must be 
willing to give up some ground to the tobacco industry to maintain the 
usefulness of an Act touted as a victorious finale to “[t]he decades-long effort 
to protect our children from the harmful effects of smoking.”230 
III.  RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS EXTERNAL TO A MODERN COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH ANALYSIS UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON 
This Comment examines the FSPTCA through the lens of the First 
Amendment’s commercial speech doctrine in order to take a prospective look 
at the implications of the current dispute in Commonwealth Brands.  This 
analysis is only one of many possible angles amenable to closer inspection.  In 
response, this Part briefly looks at a few important issues looming over the 
 
 225 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 536–38 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
 226 Id. at 537 (alterations in original) (quoting Response of United States at 36 (No. 1:09:CV:00117)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 227 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985). 
 228 See McKay, supra note 2, and accompanying text. 
 229 See Rosemary J. Avery et al., Health Disparities and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Pharmaceutical Products, in BEYOND HEALTH INSURANCE: PUBLIC POLICY TO IMPROVE HEALTH 71 
(Advances in Health Econ. & Health Servs. Research, Vol. 19, Lorens Helmchen et al. eds., 2008) 
(“Consumers who are better-informed about smoking, diet, and physical activity make healthier choices 
outside the health care sector.”). 
 230 See Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, supra note 29 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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future of tobacco regulation in an effort to acknowledge the possible 
counterarguments to the perspective adopted by this Comment.  Section A 
steps outside the Act’s provisions and asks whether the FDA is even capable of 
regulating the tobacco industry when considered in light of its already 
extensive obligations.  Section B serves as a reminder that commercial speech 
analysis under Central Hudson is anything but settled and the legitimacy of the 
FSPTCA rests squarely on the shoulders of the Supreme Court. 
A. Can the FDA Regulate Big Tobacco? 
The tobacco industry is faced with unprecedented regulation of its products 
through the FSPTCA.  For decades, the FDA shied away from regulating 
tobacco products.231  Congress similarly took a backseat approach to tobacco 
legislation, delegating minimal regulatory authority to a variety of agencies for 
the better part of fifty years.232  This regulatory hesitance may have been for 
good reason.  It remains to be seen whether the FDA can actually handle the 
overwhelming burden imposed by the tobacco industry.  As described in many 
of the proposed amendments in Part II, passing constitutional muster under the 
fourth Central Hudson prong commands an enormous burden on the FDA and 
its employees to screen advertisements and employ more subjective rules on a 
case-by-case basis.233  If the FDA’s other areas of expertise are any indication, 
the agency is already overwhelmed.234  Though Congress handed the FDA235 a 
toothless provision, ill-equipped to protect the public health, the FDA’s 
“tenacious drive to maximize its regulatory power has resulted in its advocacy 
of an interpretation of the relevant law that . . . [is] unreasonable”236 and may 
be untenable. 
 
 231 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra notes 16–19. 
 233 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985). 
 234 See Craig A. Conway, FDA Gains Regulatory Authority over Tobacco, HEALTH L. PERSP. (July 2009), 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(CC) Tobacco.pdf (noting that the FDA may only inspect 
8% of foreign drug manufacturers subject to inspection each year and has had to divert resources to address 
major health issues related to tainted food products in the past few years, including peanut butter, cookie 
dough, pistachios, and peppers). 
 235 While the modern nondelegation doctrine seems to support Congress’s delegation of tobacco 
jurisdiction to the FDA, it is by no means uncontroversial.  See McGowan, supra note 10 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court should reformulate the nondelegation doctrine to take some power away from regulatory 
agencies). 
 236 Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. FDA, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding the FDA lacks 
jurisdiction to regulate e-cigarettes under the FDCA), aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
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With the growing demands placed on the FDA, it is also important to 
consider the source of its funding and whether regulators have enough support 
to reasonably meet the FDA’s obligations.237  The Government Accountability 
Office reported that “the demands on the agency have soared in recent years 
for a variety of reasons,” and the “FDA’s resources ha[ve] not increased in 
proportion to the growing demands placed on it, putting public health at 
risk.”238  The FSPTCA does include a “User Fees” provision that allows the 
FDA to collect quarterly fees from tobacco manufacturers.239  Where these fees 
will go and whether they will help the FDA meet its public health obligations 
is yet to be seen.  But given the FSPTCA’s inconsistent provisions, Philip 
Morris’s support of the Act, and the relatively ineffective regulation left in 
place, it is hard not to view the user fees provision as the product of a deal 
between tobacco lobbyists and congressional committees meagerly trying to 
appease their constituencies while leaving the tobacco industry remarkably 
unscathed.  With the feasibility of FDA regulation clearly unsettled, the 
proposals made in this Comment should be taken, assuming (1) the FDA is a 
suitable administrative agency for tobacco regulation, and (2) the tobacco 
industry is capable of being adequately regulated. 
Whether the FDA can handle the enormous task of regulating the tobacco 
industry is better left for a separate article.  It is important nonetheless to 
recognize that there is a cogent argument that the FDA may not be the agency 
that should be regulating tobacco.  That argument sharply diverges from the 
proposals adopted in Part II that argue for amendments to the FSPTCA in order 
to give the FDA a more sensible regulatory scheme.  From either perspective, 
it is relevant to point out the hurdles facing Congress, regulators, and public 
health officials when contemplating tobacco regulation. 
B. Stepping Outside the Modern Central Hudson Framework 
The analysis adopted in this Comment arguably lacks consequence when 
considered in light of the Court’s failure to adopt a consistent standard of 
interpretation.  Looming over the entire First Amendment issue is the level of 
scrutiny the Court will apply.  As described in Part II, the Court has wavered 
dramatically over the past thirty years in its application of deference to the 
 
 237 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-271, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 16 (2009). 
 238 Id. 
 239 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387s (Supp. III 2009) (allowing fees of $85 million in 2009 and up to $712 
million for fiscal year 2019). 
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legislature.  From Central Hudson’s initial intermediate scrutiny, Posadas and 
rational basis, Coors’s and 44 Liquormart’s attempts to abolish legislative 
deference, and the recent Court compromise in Lorillard, the future of Central 
Hudson is anything but certain.240  The Lorillard decision is a prime example 
of the Court’s failure to settle on an application standard.  Rife with debate and 
marked by four concurrences and two dissents,241 the opinion lends weight to 
the conclusion that the Court has yet to find its commercial speech equilibrium.  
Should the Court revert to legislative deference or adopt a vice exception to 
commercial speech protection, the analysis in Part II would be largely for 
naught because the FSPTCA should stand unscathed, easily passing a rational 
basis challenge.  Conversely, if the Court breaks new ground and adopts a 
strict scrutiny standard, Congress would have to meet even stricter 
constitutional standards.  This would require even more government resources 
and amendments that further chip away at the already-compromised 
advertising provisions. 
Either of these scenarios, however, is unlikely.  Though some Supreme 
Court Justices and commentators appear willing to adopt a strict scrutiny 
standard, this outcome is improbable given the makeup of the Court.242  
Reverting to the standard espoused by Posadas seems even more dubious 
considering no Justice has positively cited the opinion since it was refuted in 
 
 240 However controversial, if congressional and, indirectly, public opinion are any indicators of the 
Court’s decision making, then the future of commercial speech may be in the hands of a reactive Court.  See 
generally Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 971, 984–96 (2009) (arguing that the Court responds to public opinion and congressional threats through 
Court-curbing legislation).  It is similarly instructive to note the parallel progression of the Court, presidential 
administrations, and wavering judicial ideologies applied to the commercial speech doctrine since the Central 
Hudson decision in 1980.  See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 293–322 (2009) (tracking 
presidential nominations of Supreme Court Justices and their corresponding judicial philosophies and stances 
on constitutional interpretation).  It is imperative to note that the Court took its most liberal regulatory stance 
in Posadas when the Court was filled with Burger-era Justices, a notably liberal Court.  Id. at 283.  The 
Court’s regulatory turn in Coors and 44 Liquormart was instituted in the aftermath of Ronald Reagan’s FDR-
reminiscent, court-packing strategy.  Id. at 313–14.  After public backlash from the Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), the Court set forth “a shockingly progressive set of decisions from a supposedly conservative court,” 
FRIEDMAN, supra, at 339 (quoting Dahlia Lithwick, The Ghost of the Warren Court Past, SLATE (June 26, 
2003, 2:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2084657/entry/2084901) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 
337–43.  Given Congress’s current posture and the Obama Administration’s marked interest in tobacco 
regulation, adopting a more conservative approach to commercial speech jurisprudence seems unlikely. 
 241 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 242 See supra note 166.  Though outside the scope of this Comment, Judge Posner and William Landes 
offer an enlightening look at the historical trend in Supreme Court Justice ideology through statistical 
regression and political science methodology.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial 
Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009). 
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Coors almost fifteen years ago.243  Though some political scientists argue that 
ad hoc decisional analyses like the one adopted in Central Hudson provide no 
systematic guidance and promote subjective, ideological decision making,244 
these commentators provide no workable alternative.  The Central Hudson test 
may be unavoidable for commercial speech cases where the Court must 
necessarily balance two important interests—the First Amendment and the 
public interest.  Accurately predicting the ultimate outcome may be an 
impossible endeavor, but the implications flowing from the FSPTCA are all 
too clear—the future of tobacco regulation, public health, and the right to First 
Amendment protection hang in the balance of this impending commercial 
speech decision. 
CONCLUSION 
On its face, the FSPTCA is an unprecedented regulation seeking to rein in 
the tobacco industry’s nefarious efforts at addicting a new generation of 
smokers.  Nevertheless, the First Amendment protects not only consumers and 
public information, but also unpopular speech directed at influencing consumer 
vices.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected paternalistic government 
intervention aimed at circumventing consumer choice by continually 
reinforcing Central Hudson’s core principles and challenging past deference to 
the government. 
Beyond optimistic headlines, the Act’s advertising and promotional 
restrictions are overly broad and poorly aligned with the Act’s overall purpose 
in preventing underage tobacco consumption and protecting the adult public’s 
right to truthful information.  By ignoring less restrictive alternatives and 
implementing Congress’s contradictory deal making, the Act’s advertising 
provisions are an unconstitutional affront to the commercial speech doctrine. 
Given its unconstitutional speech provisions, the FSPTCA is stripped of its 
ability to effectively control the public health consequences of tobacco by 
leaving a gutted piece of legislation effective only at reining in possibly 
healthier alternatives to traditional smoking products.  Instead of restricting 
traditional tobacco distribution, the Act bans cloves and flavored cigarettes, a 
miniscule tobacco niche, while illogically exempting menthol-flavored 
tobacco, a product that makes up more than a quarter of all tobacco sales.  
 
 243 See generally supra Part I. 
 244 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 74. 
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Amidst the myriad of inconsistencies buried in the FSPTCA, it is no wonder 
that Philip Morris supported its passage. 
The FSPTCA’s advertising provisions are the most important piece of this 
legislation.  Without these restrictions, the Act is incapable of effectively 
regulating the enormous tobacco industry and effectuating the laudable goals it 
prescribes.  Congress must be willing to put forth the resources necessary to 
amend the provisions as required by Central Hudson and provide the FDA 
with the tools needed to actively control the tobacco industry.  It is important 
to note that Congress’s refusal to ban tobacco distribution is precisely what 
leaves the door open for First Amendment protection.  Though clearly making 
the FDA’s job more difficult with cumbersome—yet constitutional—
advertising restrictions, the FDA can take the necessary steps to mitigate 
tobacco’s overwhelming effect on public health. 
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